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“Micro-Management”: Constitutional
and Policy Concerns Arising from
India’s Microfinance Institutions
(Development and Regulation) Bill
By Ashley Becker*
Abstract: At the end of 2010, India possessed the largest, most concentrated
microfinance industry in the world. Initially, Indian microfinance operations
were funded primarily by the state or charitable donations, but the industry has
grown to be largely dominated by the private sector. As this shift occurred, the
industry became quite profitable, and in the wake of its success, faced a
significant amount of backlash. When borrowers in the State of Andhra
Pradesh, home to a substantial portion of the households utilizing microcredit in
India, complained of excessive rates and predatory collection practices, the
State responded by passing a regulation that severely restricted microlending
practices. This regulation sharply affected microfinance companies’ profit
margins and growth rates, and effectively delegitimized the industry. Following
adoption of the regulation, historically high collection rates plummeted and
shares in microfinance companies fell to record lows. In July of 2011, India’s
central government released a draft bill, entitled “Micro Finance Institutions
(Development and Regulation) Bill.” The Bill provides a national regulatory
framework for India’s microfinance companies. Furthermore, the Bill preempts
existing state regulations, such as the one in Andhra Pradesh. The State of
Andhra Pradesh is resisting the Bill, arguing, inter alia, that since India’s
Constitution explicitly provides states with the power to regulate the
microfinance industry, it represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state
power by the federal government. This Comment argues that in the likely event
the Bill is passed, Indian courts will hold the adoption of the Bill constitutional,
since the federal government does, in fact, have the ability to override relevant
state legislation. Adoption of the Bill is likely to provide a solution to the
challenges faced by the microfinance industry. By providing certainty, defining
boundaries, and providing a government partner, the Bill will both promote
development with the currently stagnant microfinance industry and allow it to
regain some of the legitimacy it lost in the process of state regulation.

* J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Psychology, 2006, Colgate
University. I would like to thank the editors of this Comment for all their hard work and
thoughtful input. I would also like to thank Sunshine Becker and Charles Reinert for their
consistent support and encouragement.

711

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.

VI.

33:711 (2013)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................... 712
Relevant Background Information ................................................. 716
A. India’s Legal Infrastructure ...................................................... 716
B. The Roots of Microfinance ....................................................... 718
C. Evolution of Microfinance in India .......................................... 722
State Regulation of Microfinance in Andhra Pradesh .................... 725
A. Backlash Against the Microfinance Industry ........................... 725
B. Andhra Pradesh’s Microfinance Regulation............................. 728
Federal Regulation: Microfinance Institutions (Development
and Regulation) Bill ....................................................................... 731
Issues Posed by the Bill.................................................................. 733
A. Constitutional Issue: Division of Legislative Power ................ 733
B. Policy Issue: Government Involvement in Private Business .... 737
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 739

I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2010, India possessed the largest, most concentrated
microfinance1 industry in the world.2 Upon its inception in the country

1

The term microfinance generally “refers to the provision of financial services to lowincome clients, including the self-employed.” JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE
HANDBOOK: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (1999). This broad definition
encompasses an expansive range of services, including microcredit, which involves the
extension of very small loans to impoverished individuals in order to spur entrepreneurial
efforts. Microcredit, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microcredit
.asp#axzz1dXLmIRKv (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). In India, however, microfinance is
defined by the Task Force on Microfinance as the “provision of thrift, credit and other
financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or
urban areas for enabling them to raise their income levels and improve living standards.”
Anil K. Khandelwal, Microfinance Development Strategy for India, ECON. & POL. WKLY
1127 (2007). This Comment adopts India’s more narrow definition of microfinance to refer
solely to this type of small-scale lending. Scholarly texts, industry reports, and the Indian
government use the terms “microcredit” and “microfinance” interchangeably. In the interest
of consistency, this Comment will use the term “microfinance.”
2
Carlos Ani, India is the World’s Largest Microfinance Industry: M-CRIL,
PHILDEVFINANCE, http://phildevfinance.blogspot.com/2010/11/india-is-worlds-largestmicrofinance.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) [hereinafter M-CRIL] (“India now has the
largest microfinance industry in the world with the phenomenal growth of 62% per annum in
terms of numbers of unique clients and 88% per annum in terms of portfolio over the past
five years and around 27 million borrower accounts.”); see also Rajeshwari Adappa Thakur,
MACRO POTENTIAL FOR MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY, INDIA BRAND EQUITY FOUNDATION
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decades prior, the industry was viewed as a favorable venture that provided
a path out of poverty for individuals who traditionally lacked access to
banking and related financial services.3 While India has the world’s fourth
highest gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity4
and the world’s fiftieth fastest-growing economy,5 the country possesses
historically high poverty rates.6 Today, almost 30% of the country’s 1.2
billion citizens live below the poverty line.7 India’s high poverty rates
presented the ideal opportunity for the implementation of microfinance; by
offering small loans to impoverished individuals wishing to engage in
productive activities, the industry provided hope to the country’s poor.
However, those engaged in microfinance lending did not have wholly
altruistic intentions. Microfinance can also be a very profitable business
model. For example, the largest microfinance company, SKS Microfinance
Private Limited (SKS), raised $347 million in an initial public offering
(IPO) in 20108 and netted over 1.7 billion rupees (31 million U.S. dollars)
in profits the same year.9
Despite their initial successes, microlenders and investors may have
overlooked the political risk involved in the industry. India’s poor possess
significant political capital in the form of their votes. When borrowers in
the State of Andhra Pradesh—home to more than one-third of the
households that utilize microcredit in India—complained of excessive rates
and predatory collection practices, the State responded by passing a
regulation that severely restricted microlending practices.10 The regulation

REPORT 23 (2008), available at http://www.ibef.org/download/finance_260908.pdf.
3
See Thakur, supra note 2, at 23 (“Increasingly, microfinance is perceived as an
effective channel for ensuring financial inclusion of the low income population and those in
the informal sector.”).
4
The
World
Factbook:
India,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last updated Feb.
19, 2013) [hereinafter World Factbook].
5
India had GDP real growth rates of 10.6% in 2010 and 7.2% in 2011. Id.
6
Aasha Kapur Mehta & Amita Shah, Chronic Poverty in India: Overview Study 8–9
(Chronic Poverty Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 7, 2001), http://www.sadhan.co.in/Adls/Microfinance/PerspectivePoverty/ChronicpovertyinIndia.pdf.
7
World Factbook, supra note 4.
8
Satish Sarangarajan & John Satish Kumar, SKS Microfinance IPO Attracts Strong
Demand,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Aug.
2,
2010,
at
C2,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240527487042718045754052233560
63904.html.
9
SKS MICROFINANCE, ANNUAL REPORT: 2010–2011, at 9 (2011), available at
http://www.sksindia.com/downloads/sks_annual_report_2010_11.pdf. SKS Microfinance
reported profits after taxes of 1,739,500,000 rupees (32,341,653.75 U.S. dollars) in FY 2010.
Id.
10
Harsh Joshi, India’s Big Problem with Microfinance, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2011, at
C22.
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imposed caps on interest rates, created obligatory registration and
documentation requirements, and substantially narrowed permissible
collection practices.11 In addition to sharply affecting profit margins and
growth rates of microlending companies, the regulation effectively
delegitimized the industry. As a result, historically high collection rates
plummeted and shares in microfinance companies fell to record lows.12
Indeed, since 2010 the industry’s revenues in India have dropped about
33%.13
In July of 2011, India’s central government released a draft of a new
microfinance bill, entitled “Micro Finance Institutions (Development and
Regulation) Bill” (Bill), for comment.14 On May 22, 2012, this Bill was
introduced to Parliament.15 The Bill provides a national regulatory
framework for India’s microfinance companies, delegating primary
regulatory authority to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 16 Furthermore, the
Bill preempts existing state regulations, such as the one in Andhra
Pradesh.17 The Bill’s status is currently pending, awaiting parliamentary
approval.18

11

See Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of Moneylending) Act,
2010 Andhra Pradesh Gen. Assemb. (2010) (India).
12
Joshi, supra note 10. For a detailed quantitative illustration of the recent drop in
performance measures among India’s MFIs, see M-CRIL India Indices of Microfinance
2011, MICRO-CREDIT RATINGS INT’L LTD. (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.mcril.com/BackEnd/ModulesFiles/Publication/CRILEX-India-2011_revised.pdf (“Growth in
2010-11 was just 7.5% for borrowers and 7.2% for portfolio, greatly reduced from the 43%
and 76% growth respectively in the previous year after adjusting for multiple lending.”).
13
Interview by India Knowledge@Wharton with Vijay Mahajan, President,
Microfinance Institutions Network of India (July 26, 2012) (transcript available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4696) [hereinafter Interview
with Vijay Mahajan].
14
The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2011, Acts of
Parliament, 2011 (India); Government likely to Introduce Micro-Finance Bill in Budget
Session,
ECON.
TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2012,
2:46
PM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-26/news/30666819_1_financeinstitution-national-housing-bank [hereinafter Budget Session].
15
Vishnu Padmanabhan, The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation)
Bill,
2012,
PRS
LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH
(May
25,
2012),
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-micro-finance-institutions-development-andregulation-bill-2012-2348/; see also The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and
Regulation) Bill, 2012, No. 62, Acts of Parliment, 2012 (India) (as introduced in Lok Sabha)
[hereinafter Micro Finance Bill].
16
Micro Finance Bill, supra note 15.
17
Id.
18
The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2012, PRS LEGIS.
RES.
BILL
TRACK,
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-micro-finance-institutionsdevelopment-and-regulation-bill-2012-2348/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) [hereinafter BILL
TRACK].
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While the reaction to the Bill among industry insiders has been
favorable as measured by the markets,19 the effect it may have on the
microfinance industry is uncertain. Andhra Pradesh is resisting the Bill,
and is expected to argue that because India’s constitution explicitly
provides states with the power to regulate the microfinance industry, it
represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state power by the federal
government.20 The Bill’s opponents further argue that the mandated
association with the RBI is dangerous, because it allows microlenders to
continue their predatory practices under the authority of their alignment
with a national institution.21
This Comment argues that in the likely event the Bill is passed, Indian
courts will hold that the Bill is constitutional because the federal
government has the ability to override relevant state legislation. This
decision would likely provide a solution to the challenges faced by the
microfinance industry, supplying it with an opportunity for reinvention that
is crucial to its future success. This Comment argues that the Bill
implements the mechanisms necessary to manage 22 the unregulated
microfinance industry’s problems; by providing certainty, defining
boundaries, and providing a government partner, the Bill will both promote
development within the currently stagnant microfinance industry and allow
it to regain some of the legitimacy it lost in the process of state regulation.
Part II of this Comment provides a succinct overview of India’s legal
infrastructure. It also provides contextual background for the discussion of
the Bill’s impact by describing India’s social landscape and how this
landscape promoted the evolution of microfinance. Part III examines the
current status of the microfinance industry in India, focusing on the recent
state-promulgated regulations adopted by Andhra Pradesh. Part IV
discusses the proposed Bill and its reception by various factions in India.
Part V discusses the arguments proffered by the Bill’s opponents.
19
See Tripti Lahiri, Markets Cheer Microfinance Draft Law, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2011,
5:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/07/07/markets-cheer-microfinance-draftlaw/.
20
Vineet Rai, India’s Microfinance Bill Offers a Mixed Bag to Investors, CONSULTATIVE
GROUP ASSIST POOR (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/blog/india-microfinance-billoffers-mixed-bag-investors; V. Umakanth, The New Microfinance Institutions Bill, INDIAN
CORP. L. (July 15, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2011/07/newmicrofinance-institutions-bill.html.
21
KV Ramana, Andhra Pradesh Lambasts Microfinance Bill, Wants Full Rethink,
DAILY
NEWS
&
ANALYSIS
(July
9,
2011,
8:00
PM),
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_andhra-pradesh-lambasts-microfinance-bill-wantsfull-rethink_1563902.
22
The topic of microfinance has been aptly described as a case of “micro-management”
by one Indian news outlet. See Micro-Mismatch, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 8, 2011, 3:56, AM),
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/micromismatch/814369/. The title of this Comment is
a play on words referencing this description.
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Specifically, it examines whether the Bill represents an unconstitutional
usurpation of power, concluding that Parliament will be able to effectively
argue that the Bill is constitutional. Part V also addresses the Bill’s public
policy implications and suggests that the Bill promotes regulations that
benefit both the microfinance industry and its intended customers. Finally,
Part VI offers some concluding thoughts about the future of the
microfinance industry in India.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION
India possesses one of the largest microfinance industries in the
world.23 Microfinance in India began in the 1980s.24 By 2004, the
industry’s presence in the country consisted of 188 million accounts,
representing 18% of the nation’s total population.25 In 2008, India
experienced a 65% borrower growth rate,26 and by 2010, it possessed the
largest and most concentrated microfinance industry in the world.27
The public persona of India’s microfinance industry has changed
dramatically over the past decade. Once lauded, the industry recently
experienced a large backlash that has spurred widespread regulatory efforts.
This Part examines India’s legal framework, which serves as the forum for
these regulatory efforts as well as the basis for their controversy. This Part
also provides the necessary background for understanding the microfinance
industry and the current demand for the industry’s reform by examining the
establishment of microfinance generally as well as its evolution in India.
A. India’s Legal Infrastructure
In order to understand the regulation of India’s microfinance industry,
it is essential to have some understanding of the country’s legal
infrastructure. India is governed by a constitution, implemented in 1950,
that guarantees equal rights to all citizens and prohibits discrimination
23
Sanjay Sinha & Shweta S. Banerjee, India’s Microfinance Industry: An Anatomy of
Risk for April 2012, CONSULTATIVE GROUP ASSIST POOR (May 6, 2012),
http://www.cgap.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-microfinance-industry-anatomy-risk-april2012.
24
M.S. Sriram & Rajesh S. Upadhyayula, The Transformation of the Microfinance
Sector in India: Experiences, Options, and Future, 6 J. OF MICROFINANCE, 2004, at 89,
available at http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~mssriram/jmf.pdf.
25
Robert Peck Christen, Richard Rosenberg, & Veena Jayadeva, Financial Institutions
with a “Double-Bottom Line”: Implications for the Future of Microfinance, OCCASIONAL
PAPER (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, D.C.), July 2004, available at
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2701/OP8.pdf.
26
Microfinance Information Exchange, The Microbanking Bulletin No. 19, 5 (Sept.
2009),
available
at
http://www.cerise-microfinance.org/IMG/pdf/MBB_19__December_2009.pdf.
27
See M-CRIL, supra note 2.
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based on race, ethnicity, gender, caste, or religion.28 India’s Constitution
also contains “directive principles of state policy,” which “require the
government to set goals for the welfare of the people, such as a minimum
wage, jobs for people from disadvantaged backgrounds, and subsidized
medical care.”29
Based largely on the United Kingdom’s system of government, India’s
Constitution divides the federal government into three branches: executive,
legislative, and judicial. The executive branch consists of the President,
Vice President, and Prime Minister.30 The bicameral legislative branch,31
also known as Parliament, or Sansad, is composed of an upper house (the
Council of States, or Rajya Sabha) and a lower house (the House of People,
or Lok Sabha).32 The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, which is
the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and the laws of India, as well as
High Courts at the state level and a hierarchy of Subordinate Courts.33
Laws or amendments to India’s Constitution are made by Parliament.34
An amendment bill must be passed by a two-thirds majority vote in both
Houses of Parliament.35 Furthermore, certain amendments, which pertain to
the federal nature of the constitution, must be ratified by a majority of state
legislatures.36 The constitution provides for judicial review by the Supreme
Court and High Courts, which extends to every governmental or executive
action, including all legislation.37
India uses a common law legal system based on the English model.38
One feature of the Indian Constitution that differentiates it from the U.S.
Constitution is that, while there are separate federal and state laws with
28

INDIA CONST. art. 14–15; Navoneel Dayanan, Cornell L. School Asian Am. L.
Students’ Ass’n & LLM Ass’n, Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region (Apr.
10,
2004)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=lps_lsapr.
29
Dayanan, supra note 28.
30
World Factbook, supra note 4.
31
However, the legislative bodies for many Indian states, such as Andhra Pradesh, are
unicameral.
Origin
and
Growth,
AP
ONLINE,
http://www.aponline.gov.in/quick%20links/legislature/legislature.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2011).
32
World Factbook, supra note 4.
33
Indian
Judiciary,
MAPS
INDIA
(Jan.
25,
2011),
http://www.mapsofindia.com/events/republic-day/india-judiciary.html.
34
Gurram Ramachandra Rao, India: Judicial Review in India, MONDAQ (Apr. 10, 2003),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=20649.
35
Constitution Amendment Bills, PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE: LOK SABHA,
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/abstract/constitution_amendment_bills.htm (last visited May
22, 2013).
36
Id.
37
Rao, supra note 34.
38
Dayanan, supra note 28.
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predefined areas of application, India has a single integrated court system
that administers both federal and state laws.39 The Supreme Court of India
is the highest court, under which there are High Courts, presiding over one
or a group of states. Below the High Courts are a hierarchy of Subordinate
Courts, state courts divided into Judicial Districts presided over by a
District and Sessions Judge, and lower courts divided into a Criminal and a
Civil Jurisdiction.40
The Supreme Court and the High Courts of India are the two
“constitutional courts” vested with the power to protect the fundamental
rights of citizens and interpret the constitution and other laws.41 The
Supreme Court, located in New Delhi, is comprised of the Chief Justice of
India and twenty-five other Judges appointed by India’s President.42 Its
exclusive original jurisdiction extends to any dispute between the federal
government and one or more states, or between the states themselves.43
There are twenty-one High Courts in India, each having jurisdiction over at
least one state.44 While they work under the guidance and supervision of
the Supreme Court, “no direct administrative control is exercised by the
latter that may in any way affect the functioning of the High Courts as
independent judicial institutions.”45
Supreme Court decisions are
considered binding law, while High Court decisions are binding only in
respect to their state jurisdiction.46
It is under this framework that both state and federal regulation of the
microfinance industry, as well as potential rulings on the constitutionality of
these regulations, occurs.
B. The Roots of Microfinance
Microfinance in its modern form is a relatively new industry, not just
in India, but worldwide. Globally, needy individuals have traditionally
lacked access to the financial services provided by banks, regardless of the
sum of money involved.47 One of the primary reasons for this is the
significant transaction costs associated with servicing client accounts.48

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Dayanan, supra note 28.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
About Microfinance, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/microfinance (last visited Feb.
5, 2012).
48
JOHN O. OGBOR, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 160 (2009).
40
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Another major reason is that the poor lack assets that can be used as
collateral to secure loans, providing banks with little recourse against
defaulting borrowers.49 As a result of being denied access to credit services
from formal banking and lending institutions, impoverished individuals’
access to credit was limited to either traditional development programs—
which were criticized for failing to reach the world’s neediest50—or to
moneylenders51 known for their predatory lending practices.52
Modern microfinance developed as a solution to the poor’s need for
access to credit. The industry materialized in the 1970’s in response to the
“widespread perception that traditional development programs, funded by
international agencies such as the World Bank . . . largely failed to reach the
world’s poorest or to improve their life chances.”53 Furthermore, research
shows that not only were these programs failing to reach their intended
recipients, they actually undermined the developmental goals they were
intended to carry out.54 Microfinance was established to provide a
mechanism for putting money “directly into the hands of the poor” in a
manner that would immediately impact their economic prospects.55
Given its goal of providing credit solutions to an under-served
population, microfinance clearly started with an altruistic slant. In its initial
phases, microfinance involved a standard procedure. Money would be lent
to the needy; the principal amount would then be collected, with interest,
and the proceeds from the collected payment would be contributed to a pool
of capital that would be re-lent to other borrowers.56 It was intended that
borrowers would use the loaned money to fund small entrepreneurial

49

Id.; see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN
162 (1989) (discussing the limited scope of the poor’s assets).
50
Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of
Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 92 (2002).
51
A moneylender is defined as “a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the
business of advancing and realising loans.” RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL GROUP SET UP TO REVIEW LEGISLATIONS ON MONEY LENDING § 4.5 (2007),
available at http://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=513.
Typically for an unincorporated individual, or small group of individuals, a moneylender
uses their own funds to offer consumer credit and agricultural loans in the form of cash to
members of a limited geographic region, often restricting their activity to the town where
they reside. Id. § 3.3. While various news articles and academic works alternate between
the spellings “money-lender” and “moneylender,” this Comment uses the term
“moneylender” for the sake of consistency.
52
M. P. Vasimalai & K. Narender, Microfinance for Poverty Reduction: The Kalanjiam
Way, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1190, 1193 (Mar. 31, 2007).
53
Anderson, supra note 50.
54
See, DALE W. ADAMS, DOUGLAS H. GRAHAM & J. D. VON PISCHKE, UNDERMINING
RURAL DEVELOPMENT WITH CHEAP CREDIT (1984).
55
Anderson, supra note 50.
56
Id. at 91.
THE THIRD WORLD
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enterprises, which would hopefully provide them with an ongoing source of
income.57 A microlender may, for example, loan a borrower enough money
to cover the cost of a goat. Upon purchasing the goat, the borrower would
be able to produce and sell the goat’s milk. The profits from these sales
would allow the borrower to maintain a constant income stream. Thus,
rather than providing the borrower with temporary relief from financial
distress, the microloan was intended to provide the borrower with an
enduring source of financial support.
In the initial phases of microfinance, government agencies were the
primary providers of “productive credit” to the needy.58 These lending
programs, heavily subsidized by international donors, were criticized due to
their large loan losses and the lending organizations’ frequent need to
recapitalize, or put new money into their business, in order to continue
operations.59 This led to microfinance in its modern form, rooted primarily
in the private sector, as a market-based solution that quickly became viewed
as “an integral part of the financial system.”60
Traditionally, microfinance programs possessed two features that
drove their success. First, impoverished people, particularly women, had
excellent repayment rates that were often better than the formal financial
sectors of most developing countries.61 Second, “the poor were willing and
able to pay interest rates that allowed [microlenders] to cover their costs.”62
Thus, microlenders were able to function sustainably while reaching a large
number of clients. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, microfinance
was viewed as a tool of socioeconomic development, and was operated
overwhelmingly as a non-profit enterprise, concentrated in developing
countries throughout South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.63
Efforts to establish and implement microfinance were lauded
worldwide. One of the most exalted figures in microfinance is Muhammad
Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and one of the
industry’s pioneers.64 The Grameen Bank arose out of a study conducted by
Yunus, then a professor at the Chittagong University in Bangladesh, in
which he interviewed impoverished residents of villages surrounding the

57

Id.
LEDGERWOOD, supra note 1, at 2.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
The History of Microfinance, GLOBAL ENVISION (Apr. 14, 2006),
http://globalenvision.org/library/4/1051/.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Anne Perkins, A Short History of Microfinance, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2008, 7:20 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2008/jun/03/livelihoods.projectgoals1.
58
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University in order to better understand their experiences with poverty.65
He concluded that the reason people were poor was that they “lacked access
to credit at reasonable interest rates and under appropriate conditions.”66
Yunus attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince traditional banks to lend
small amounts of money to the needy.67 The inability of traditional banks
to provide adequate financing led him to conclude that “specialized
financial institutions” were needed to provide these loans.68 Such
institutions would need to be willing to provide loans to the impoverished
individuals on terms and conditions that were appropriate for them.69
Yunus established the Grameen Bank using a model that was quite
distinct from the traditional banking model. Strict qualification criteria
were established to ensure a focus on the needy.70 In order to provide
incentives for repayment, the bank implemented an innovative lending
scheme in which borrowers were required to form groups of five and
“accept joint responsibility for repayment of loans.”71 The ability to access
future credit was conditioned upon repayment of each group members’
loan.72 Another unique feature of the Grameen Bank’s model was that
small loans were repaid in weekly installments over the period of one
year.73 Furthermore, rather than require borrowers to travel to the bank for
service, Grameen Bank workers traveled to the borrowers’ homes to
provide service.74 This innovative framework distinguished the Grameen
Bank from its peers in its ability to address the specific needs of the poor.
Under this model, the Bank began in 1976 as a research project that
served one local village and soon spread to neighboring villages.75 In 1983,
the government of Bangladesh recognized the Grameen Bank as an
independent bank.76 The bank grew rapidly, expanding both in loan
coverage and volume.77 In 2006, the organization and its founder were
65
Alexandra Bernasek, Banking on Social Change: Grameen Bank Lending to Women,
16 INT’L J. OF POL., CULTURE, & SOC’Y 369, 371 (2003).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 372.
68
Id.
69
A Short History of Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114 (last updated Jan.
1, 2013).
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jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, placing the microfinance industry in
the international spotlight.78 Today, the Bank boasts that it is “owned by
the poor whom it serves,” with borrowers owning 90% of its shares and the
Bengali Government owning the remaining 10%.79
While the Grameen Bank appears to have preserved its philanthropic
roots by maintaining a structure that functions primarily to serve the needy,
not every microfinance institution (MFI)80 can say the same. Over time, the
industry’s rapid growth has coincided with a shift from operations being
funded primarily by the state or charitable donations to being largely
dominated by the private sector.81 With this has come a shift from nonprofit to for-profit business models. While this transformation has occurred
worldwide, it is especially salient in India. The repercussions of this shift in
India are discussed in more depth in the following subpart.
C. Evolution of Microfinance in India
As is the case in many other countries, microfinance in India was
traditionally operated under a non-profit model.
The origins of
microfinance in India can be traced back to the early 1970s when the Self
Employed Women’s Association of the State of Gujarat created an urban
cooperative bank, with the objective of offering banking services to
impoverished women employed in rural parts of the state.82 The industry
evolved in the 1980s around self-help groups (SHGs), which are “informal
bodies that would provide their clients with much-needed savings and credit
services.”83 India’s microfinance sector grew rapidly, evolving into a multibillion dollar industry.84
Like other countries that have embraced the industry, the foundation of
India’s microfinance industry rests on the failure of state-owned financial
institutions to extend credit to the poor as well as the disappointing
performance of government programs intended to alleviate poverty by
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The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2006),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.
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80
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Microfinance in India: A Crisis at the Bottom of the Pyramid, LEGATUM VENTURES 2
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providing those in need with resources for self-employment.85 The industry
operates on the assumption that “the core of poverty lies in the realm of the
‘economic’ and credit (debt) is an effective tool that helps the poor tackle
the problem of deprivation, improve their welfare and social acceptance and
credibility.”86 In India, “the industry has grown under two different
systems of patronage.”87 The first system, linked to the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD),88 has the patronage of the
state as well as formal banking institutions.89 A parallel system is funded
exclusively through the private sector.90 Due to the government’s lack of
involvement, the latter system traditionally functioned outside of any
formalized legal or regulatory framework.91
Rapid development within India’s microfinance industry brought
significant diversification. Today, Indian MFIs range from “Grameenreplicator [non-government organizations (NGOs)] to for-profit
entrepreneurial ventures to developmental NGOs.”92 Private sector MFIs
dominate the industry, demonstrating a shift from the overwhelmingly
government and charity-sponsored MFIs that founded the industry in India.
Recent data indicates that over one thousand MFIs operate in India,93 and
“the top five private sector MFIs reach more than 20 million clients in
nearly every state in India.”94 One of the reasons proffered for this shift is
“private sector institutions are able to attract increasingly large amounts of
private capital,” which “accelerate[s] the growth of the industry.”95
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Furthermore, India, with its immense impoverished population and wellestablished microfinance tradition, offered a captive market from which
private sector MFIs could derive significant profits.
The shift from public to private sector may be best exemplified by
SKS Microfinance Ltd., India’s largest MFI by assets.96 Founded in 1997,
SKS began its operations as an NGO known as SKS NGO or SKS
Society.97 After several years of operating under this model, SKS’s
management, aware of the company’s vast capacity to produce revenue,
found itself constrained by the non-profit model.98 In 2003, as a response to
the growing demand for microfinance, SKS Society created a private
company called SKS Microfinance Private Limited.99 SKS transitioned its
lending operations to this corporate form and continued to gain momentum,
leveraging its equity to raise debt from the public and private sector as well
as multinational banks operating in India.100 Among its investors was
Sequoia Capital, a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley that participated in
an $11.5 million private share offering by SKS in March 2007.101 In May
2009, SKS was converted into a public limited company,102 and on July 28,
2010, the company made its debut on the Bombay Stock Exchange.103 The
IPO resulted in $350 million in sales and a 30% increase in SKS’s stock
96
John Satish Kumar, Global Finance: SKS Says That Debt Collections Are Suffering
Amid New Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2010, at C3. At the end of 2010, SKS’s assets
exceeded $320.2 million. MFI Report, MIX MARKET, http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/sks
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97
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ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A1.
102
A “public limited company” is an entity organized under § 3(1)(iv) of India’s
Companies Act 1956 where ownership is held by the general public, including individuals,
officers, employees, and institutional investors. Companies Act 1956, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA
CODE (2012), § 3(1)(iv). “The liability of each shareholder is limited to the extent of the
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price.104 At the end of 2010, SKS’s future appeared bright as it boasted
more borrowers than any other MFI in India.105 Unfortunately, as Part III
illustrates, 2011 did not bode well for SKS.
III. STATE REGULATION OF MICROFINANCE IN ANDHRA
PRADESH
In 2010, India’s microfinance industry was a successful sector.
Moreover, Indian society embraced the microfinance industry, especially
the needy whom the industry claimed to benefit. The industry experienced
rapid growth, and with rapid growth came an increasingly watchful
governmental gaze. This Part discusses the backlash faced by the
microfinance industry in the wake of its success as well as the resulting
state regulation.
A. Backlash Against the Microfinance Industry
From its initial phases through the height of its success, India’s
microfinance industry was viewed as the “silver bullet to uplift the poor.”106
What appears to be one of the most significant factors in its rapid growth
and success is the industry’s ability to combine altruism with capitalism.
While some say increased capital is necessary to reach more borrowers,107
others view for-profit MFIs, and in particular, publicly traded MFIs, as
offering the “chance of making money out of poor people.”108
Regardless of whether MFIs’ intentions are purely altruistic, purely
capitalistic, or a combination of the two, it is clear that the industry’s rapid
growth and increasing profits have drawn a significant amount of criticism.
Critics often point to SKS’s IPO as the cause of increased scrutiny toward
the industry. S.P. Tusian, an investment adviser and analyst at Premium
Investments in Mumbai, stated: “The SKS IPO opened [up] Pandora’s box.
The IPO brought SKS under the scanner and, along with it, the realization
of the practices of other microfinance institutions, too.”109 Extensive media
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coverage of the IPO and the company’s public filings revealed SKS’s
business practices for the first time. Once these practices came to light,
Indian citizens and government officials were troubled by what they saw.
One area of criticism targeted the interest rates that MFIs charged.
While not as high as the rates charged by moneylenders, MFIs’ interest
rates varied between 25% and 100%.110 These rates were much higher than
those associated with bank loans.111 Commercial MFIs claimed that interest
rates needed to be this high in order to cover the costs of making thousands
of microloans.112 Unlike banks, MFIs do not collect deposits; working
capital, therefore, comes from the principal and interest collected from
borrowers.113 High interest rates are likely instituted, at least partially, to
maximize liquidity.
The practice of lending is expensive, even for small loans, particularly
when considered in relation to the size of the transactions involved.114 “A
$100 dollar loan, for example, requires the same personnel and resources as
a $2,000 one,” notes one commentator, “thus increasing per unit transaction
costs.”115 The high interest rates also likely account for the heightened risk
associated with lending to individuals who would be denied credit at formal
banking institutions.
Critics, however, say the rates charged by MFIs are exorbitant and
exploitive of the poor who, with limited options, must resort to microloans
regardless of the associated interest rate, fueling a cycle of indebtedness.116
One borrower, addressing this cycle, stated: “I understand that it is credit,
that you have to pay interest, and your debt grows. But sometimes the
problems we have seem like they can only be solved by taking another loan.
One problem solved, another created.”117
Moreover, the Indian microfinance industry was accused of employing
predatory collection practices. Borrowers complained of harassment by
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MFI agents.118 Reportedly, agents went as far as showing up at borrowers’
doorsteps, demanding loan repayment, and making threats to those who
failed to repay.119 In one instance, three agents showed up at a woman’s
doorstep, physically restrained her, and made profanity-laced threats to
her.120
Multiple lending is another problem stemming from the growth of the
microfinance industry. The industry’s growth resulted in a large number of
MFIs competing with each other for borrowers.121 This market saturation
allowed customers to take out loans from a large number of lenders that
were desperate for customers, before paying off existing loans.122 As one
commentator notes: “[C]ommercial lenders cut costs by poaching loan
officers from their rivals and targeting the same borrowers. This allow[ed]
them to collect a higher return on equity as they [did not] have to invest in
new communities, which normally require[d] training and preparation in
how to use microfinance.”123 This increased competition even led some
MFIs to extend multiple loans to a single borrower.124
The lending practices utilized by MFIs concerned experts, who feared
that borrowers were being encouraged to take on more debt than they could
handle.125 The significant over-indebtedness in the Indian population that
MFIs were designed to serve led to increased pressure among borrowers
that some say has had catastrophic consequences. Indian press and
government officials linked both stress-related deaths and increased suicide
rates among the needy to their inability to repay microloans.126 MFIs
claimed that for the suicides they investigated that were attributed to their
lending, “microloans were among the smallest of the many problems of the
people that have killed themselves.”127 The string of suicides, nonetheless,
118
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spurned a rash of hostility toward MFIs.
With the microfinance industry facing an onslaught of negative
publicity, Indian citizens began to express concern that MFIs were allowing
profit-seeking business practices to overshadow altruistic intentions. While
the poor suffered, MFIs were accused of “unseemly enrichment by
promoters and senior executives.”128 Critics alleged “the surge in for-profit
MFIs driven by equity investors has skewered the industry away from its
pro-poor roots.”129 In an attempt to defend the microfinance industry, one
MFI executive blamed “rogue” lenders for the backlash, pleading, “[d]o not
destroy the entire industry because of the actions of a few rogue players.”130
Clearly, however, the entire industry was under scrutiny. Although it may
have primarily stemmed from the actions of a few money-driven “rogue
players,” the entire industry was shrouded in a cloak of criticism. With this
widespread criticism bringing the microfinance industry into the
government’s purview, government intervention was imminent.
B. Andhra Pradesh’s Microfinance Regulation
The criticism targeting the microfinance industry in 2010 was
especially noticeable in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Andhra Pradesh,
situated on the southeastern coast of India, experienced widespread
microlending activity. In 2010, “[m]ore than a third of the 30 million
households that [used] micro-credit in India live[d] in Andhra Pradesh.”131
Of those who took microcredit, many experienced the effects of overindebtedness; the government estimated that families who took out
microloans in Andhra Pradesh had an average debt of $660 and an average
annual income of $1060.132
India’s poor have a large political vote. When politicians became
aware of the harms experienced by borrowers at the hands of MFIs, they
saw an opportunity to intervene in an industry many were already beginning
to view with suspicion.133 Andhra Pradesh responded to the complaints by
developing regulations that severely restricted microlending practices. The
State began curbing the interest MFIs could collect. In the fall of 2010,
“State regulators . . . ordered a freeze on loan repayments where the interest
exceeds the principal.”134 Furthermore, Andhra Pradesh politicians urged
borrowers to stop making loan payments altogether.135 Full-blown
128
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regulation was cemented in December of 2010 when the Andhra Pradesh
State Assembly approved the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions
(Regulation of Moneylending) Act, 2010 (Act).136
The Act contains many provisions that severely restrict MFIs’ lending
and collection practices. First, the Act requires all MFIs operating in
Andhra Pradesh to register with the State.137 Upon registration, MFIs must
indicate:
[T]he villages or towns in which they have been operating or propose
to operate, the rate of interest being charged or proposed to be
charged, system of conducting due diligence and system of effecting
recovery and list of persons authorized for conducting the activity of
lending or recovery of money which has been lent.138

The Act also imposes restrictions on multiple loans.139 Furthermore,
the Act caps interest rates and requires government approval of margins
between borrowing costs and interest rates. The Act prescribes that “no
MFI shall recover from the borrower towards interest in respect of any
loans advanced by it . . . an amount in excess of the principal amount.”140
The Act also requires that MFIs maintain detailed documentation and
account records that can be produced, inspected, or seized by Andhra
Pradesh officials.141 Finally, the Act institutes severe penalties for coercive
or predatory collection practices.142
The Act was a catastrophic blow to the microfinance industry. The
limitations on interest rates and state-backed lack of repayments cut off a
major source of liquidity for struggling MFIs. 143 The collection rates of
most Andhra Pradesh-based MFIs fell from 99% before the issuance of the
Act to around 20% following the promulgation of the Act.144 Worsening
matters for MFIs, banks and other investors “turned off the credit tap that
allows microfinance lenders to operate” in the months following the Act’s
adoption because of concern over repayment and profitability under the new
Nov. 17, 2010, at C3.
136
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regulation.145 Bhartiya Samruddhi Finance Ltd., India’s oldest MFI, had
almost half its loan portfolio in Andhra Pradesh at the time of the Act’s
passage.146 It reported a net loss of 5.8 billion rupees (over 106 million
U.S. dollars) for 2011–12.147
In addition to its crippling financial impact, the Act had a
delegitimizing effect on the microfinance industry.148 State-sponsored
resistance to loan repayment diminished the authority of MFIs, and officials
say there has been a cascading effect on the repayment habits of borrowers
in other states.149 Furthermore, the Act drew not just nationwide, but
worldwide attention to the overly aggressive and profit-driven practices of
some microlenders.150 The attention garnered by the Act focused on the
negative aspects of the industry without differentiating between the forprofit MFIs engaged in predatory practices and legitimate MFIs. 151 In fact,
there was little differentiation between for-profit and not-for-profit MFIs,
causing even the most philanthropic organizations’ reputations to suffer.152
The executive director of a large network of non-profit MFIs stated: “It’s
not only the bad boys that will get hit. Everyone will get hit. People can’t
differentiate between who are the good boys and who are the bad boys.”153
Based on the widespread consequences of the Act, it appeared that India’s
future would become one absent of microlenders, a disturbing reality for
those who viewed microloans as a means of empowerment.
The entire country watched as the microfinance business was
criticized, regulated, and ground to a halt in Andhra Pradesh. Given the
extensive media coverage the microfinance industry was generating, the
Indian government felt compelled to address the industry’s federal
145
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regulatory framework.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION: MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS
(DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION) BILL
In the wake of the events in Andhra Pradesh, India’s federal
government determined that a national level response was in order.
Consequently, the Ministry of Finance proposed the Microfinance
Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill (Bill), which was released
for comment in July of 2011.154 The Bill was introduced to Parliament on
May 22, 2012 and is currently awaiting parliamentary approval.155
Recognizing that MFIs have the potential to play an important role in
an inclusive financial system, the Bill seeks “to create uniform policies for
regulation and development of the [microfinance] sector,” rather than
restrict the microfinance industry to the point of futility.156 “The MFI sector
has a lot of potential,” stated Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC) India Chief Naina Lal Kidwai, “but it needs to have a
defined set of rules to function in a proper way.”157 The Bill defines the
industry’s boundaries and provides a much-needed element of certainty.
The Bill requires existing microlenders to register with the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI),158 which will assume a supervisory role with the power to
dictate the margins MFIs are allowed to have between their own borrowing
costs and the fees and interest rates MFIs charge.159 Other factors included
in RBI’s regulatory scope include permissible loan amounts, methods of
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recovery, and location of operations.160 MFIs’ compliance with these
directives “will determine their future scope of services, ability to mobilize
various types of finance and to be part of the mainstream financial
system.”161 RBI will also be empowered to delegate responsibility to the
National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) when it
deems such a delegation suitable.162 Additionally, RBI has the power to
impose monetary penalties for any contravention of the Bill’s provisions.163
Notably, the Bill mandates that “the provisions of this Act shall have
effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by
virtue of any such law.”164 This clause of the Bill, entitled “Act to have
overriding effect,” clearly indicates that the Bill’s drafters intended the Bill
to override conflicting state laws, such as the one in Andhra Pradesh.165
Furthermore, the Bill explicitly clarifies that MFIs do not include “any
individual carrying on the activity of money-lending and registered as a
moneylender under the provision of any State law,” providing additional
assurance that MFIs cannot be regulated by states.166
MFIs have responded favorably to the Bill.167 Companies expect that
the Bill will allow them to expand their businesses168 and collect
outstanding loans.169 Many industry insiders believe it will lend credibility
to the industry by bringing MFIs into the realm of organized financial
services.170 Furthermore, assuming that the Bill will override any state
regulation of the industry, such as the Act in Andhra Pradesh, MFIs will
have the opportunity to avoid the state-imposed restrictions, which are
substantially more severe. The market appears to support the industry’s
positive outlook on the Bill. On the day following the Bill’s public release,
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SKS posted a 20% gain in trading on the Bombay Stock Exchange, closing
at 411 rupees after opening at 333.50 rupees.171 However, the Bill’s
reception has not been entirely positive, as evidenced by Andhra Pradesh’s
strong objections to the Bill. These objections have the potential to
interfere with the Bill’s adoption.
V. ISSUES POSED BY THE BILL
India’s proposed microfinance bill has had a polarizing effect on the
country. While many analysts believe the Bill will succeed in providing
significant solutions to the challenges faced by both the microfinance
industry and the individuals whom it serves, others, including the State of
Andhra Pradesh, staunchly oppose the Bill. The arguments proffered by the
Bill’s opponents fall into two veins of logic. The first has a constitutional
basis. Opponents argue that India’s Constitution explicitly vests states with
the power to regulate the microfinance industry, and thus the Bill’s attempt
to control something solely within the state’s purview amounts to an
unconstitutional usurpation of power.172 The second argument rests on the
Bill’s policy implications. Opponents assert that, by aligning MFIs with
RBI, the Bill allows microlenders to continue their predatory practices
under the authority of their alliance with a national institution.173 The
following subparts explore these two arguments, concluding that neither
offers a sufficient reason for rejecting the Bill’s adoption.
A. Constitutional Issue: Division of Legislative Power
While Parliament is confident the Bill supersedes state laws, Andhra
Pradesh asserts that the federal government is attempting to control
something that falls solely within the state’s purview, amounting to an
unconstitutional usurpation of power.174 This argument rests on the division
of legislative power between state legislatures and Parliament.
India’s Constitution defines and divides state and federal legislative
powers into three lists: (1) the Union List, which defines the items
Parliament has exclusive power to legislate; (2) the State List, which
defines the items states have exclusive power to legislate; and (3) the
Concurrent List, which defines the items both Parliament and the states
have the power to regulate.175 India’s Constitution includes a doctrine to
address conflicts that arise between laws passed on the same subject by the
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two legislatures.176 This doctrine, however, only applies when the subject
matter of the legislation is on the Concurrent List:
Where the subject-matter of the legislation in question falls within
either the Union List or the State list only, then . . . [o]ne of the two
laws must necessarily be void, because . . . the Indian constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Parliament for matters in the
Union List and upon a State Legislature for matters in the State
List.177

The constitutionality of the Bill rests, then, on which list encompasses
microfinance.
There is no reference to “microfinance” on the Union List, State List,
or Concurrent List.178 Item thirty on the state list, however, is “[m]oneylending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness.”179 Andhra
Pradesh claims state governments are authorized to pass a law such as the
Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions Act because microfinance
institutions “come under the purview of money-lending activity, and hence,
the state law.”180 Thus, Andhra Pradesh argues, it is clearly within its
power to create and enforce its own laws regulating MFIs. 181 Based on this
logic, whether the Bill overrides state legislation rests on whether
microfinance qualifies as “[m]oney-lending.”
Moneylenders have a tradition in India dating back thousands of years.
Historically, their sole financial service was to provide loans from their own
resources.182 They are known for charging high interest rates for the small
loans they issue to the needy, as well as using strong-arm tactics to ensure
collection.183 Moneylenders, referred to as “village loan sharks,”184 are
typically individuals who lend in the community they reside, operating
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vastly unregulated.185
While some rogue MFIs may seem to be properly characterized as
moneylenders, there are significant differences between MFIs and
moneylenders. Despite the recent emphasis on profits within the industry,
many MFIs still possess altruistic intentions and are not driven solely by
financial gain. Unlike informal moneylenders, these MFIs are registered,
formal institutions that aim to lend and manage funds used mainly for
productive activities, engage in a range of financial activities, and typically
operate as a business collective rather than through individual agents.186
Furthermore, upon adoption of the Bill, microfinance will be a highly
regulated industry that operates as an extension of the RBI, distinguishing it
even further from usurious moneylenders. MFIs that attempt to carry out
practices typically associated with moneylenders will be estopped by the
new law.
In the event the draft Bill becomes law, the definitional distinctions
between MFIs and moneylenders will likely be insufficient to resolve the
conflict; Andhra Pradesh has already threatened to bring the issue before
the Supreme Court.187 If the Bill does reach judicial review, it is likely that
Parliament will be able to successfully assert the power to regulate the
microfinance industry, thus usurping state regulations. The Bill’s drafters
appeared to anticipate Andhra Pradesh’s argument. As previously
discussed, the Bill contains language that makes it clear microfinance
institutions should be distinguished from moneylenders.188 Indeed, “the
most critical part of the Bill is that MFIs registered with the Indian central
bank won’t be treated as moneylenders. This essentially means they will be
kept out of the purview of a state law, which has restricted the operations of
microlenders.”189 This distinction, however, is not one contrived by
Parliament solely for the purpose of usurping the Andhra Pradesh’s Act; the
microfinance industry has historically been viewed as distinct from
moneylenders, making it more difficult for states to argue they have sole
legislative authority over its regulation.190
185
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As an alternative to the characterization of moneylenders, the federal
government may be able to successfully argue that microfinance, the
subject-matter of the Bill, should be classified as “banking” or even “the
Reserve Bank of India,” both of which are items included on the Union
List.191 The Bill establishes a prominent partnership between MFIs and the
RBI. This link with a banking partner, as well as the formalized
requirements the Bill imposes upon MFIs, could bring them into the realm
of a banking institution. Furthermore, the constitution provides that
“Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any
matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.”192 If the federal
government can successfully argue that MFIs are neither moneylenders nor
banks, but instead a non-enumerated power, then they also have the ability
regulate them, overriding any conflicting state regulation.
While Indian courts have issued varying opinions regarding the scope
of moneylending,193 recent jurisprudence suggests courts will find that
MFIs fall within Parliament’s authority. In a February 2013 opinion
upholding the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of
Money Lending) Act, 2010, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
acknowledged the federal government’s ability to govern MFIs.194 The
possibility that a court could determine the definition of moneylenders
properly includes MFIs is thus unlikely.
However, even if the Supreme Court believes that microfinance does
classify as moneylending, the federal government may still be able to
prevail by asserting Parliament’s power to legislate with respect to a matter
that is of “national interest.” The constitution gives Parliament the power to
legislate on matters enumerated in the State List if they are “necessary or
expedient in the national interest.”195 The negative impacts of an
unregulated microfinance industry were felt throughout India, drawing
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national concern and bolstering support for federal regulation. India clearly
has an interest in protecting the poor, a constituency large enough in India
for their interests to qualify as national interest. It is this group of
impoverished individuals that is most susceptible to exploitation by MFIs.
This, taken in combination with the historic distinction between
moneylenders and MFIs, the regulation’s partnering of MFIs with RBI, and
Parliament’s residuary power, gives the government numerous courses to
ensure the Bill will preempt Andhra Pradesh’s and other state regulations.
It will be very difficult for Andhra Pradesh to defend its law in the face of
these arguments.
B. Policy Issue: Government Involvement in Private Business
The Bill’s critics, including the State of Andhra Pradesh, have also
voiced concern that the Bill prescribes an inappropriate level of government
involvement in private business. Opponents argue that intertwining the
business of the microfinance institutions with that of the banks could be
dangerous.196 They argue:
[I]f the MFIs become the ‘extended arms of banks’, banks will have
no reason to push the financial inclusion agenda of the RBI forward.
As a result, the unserviced, undeveloped rural areas will be ceded by
the banks to these financing companies leaving them at the mercy of
the MFIs and their agents.197

Furthermore, critics argue:
[If] the intention is to equate the MFIs with the banking network, the
correct course would be to mandate them to convert into banks and
operate under the banking regulation. By giving them a status of a
bank by a back door, the [Bill] allows giving them privileges enjoyed
by a bank without the concomitant obligations.198

If the Bill is implemented according to its drafters’ intentions,
however, aligning the industry with the RBI will necessitate closer
regulation of the industry, which, in turn will lead to a greater level of
oversight, higher levels of detection, and more deterrence of the previously
unrestrained lending practices the public criticizes. In addition, the
possibilities that MFIs will have their registration revoked or receive a hefty
monetary penalty by the RBI in the instance of such conduct serve as
deterrents that add additional consumer-protection elements to the RBI-MFI
196
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partnership.
The likelihood for predatory collection practices and
exorbitant rates (which are explicitly restricted by the Bill) will
significantly diminish as a result of the alignment.
Critics argue that the provision in the Bill that gives the RBI authority
to delegate power to NABARD undermines the regulatory authority the
RBI exercises over the microfinance industry. These critics reason, as the
primary service provider to SHGs in the microfinance industry, NABARD
is currently “a key participant in this sector . . . It is widely recognized that
combining the role of service provider and regulator is not a good
governance practice, as it could lead to serious conflict of interest.”199
However, the authorized delegation of authority to NABARD is permissive,
not mandatory, and given RBI’s supervisory role, it is likely that any
authority delegated is carefully considered in order to assess potential
conflicts of interest that could weaken the regulatory system. 200 Given the
experience NABARD has in the microfinance sector, it may be more
capable of identifying weaknesses and points of improvement in the
regulatory system, providing the potential to actually strengthen the
regulatory framework.
Without the proposed Bill, impoverished individuals will be left worse
off than they are at present. The unregulated microfinance industry’s
profits have plummeted over the past year as a result of losing important
investors and the large state-backed lack of repayment.201 This rapid loss of
capital prevents MFIs from extending loans to those in need.202 Despite the
recent controversy, many impoverished individuals rely on MFIs as their
only access to the capital that formal banking institutions are unwilling to
extend. Foreclosing this option could have detrimental implications for the
poor.
Rather than leave the needy worse off, the partnership between the
RBI and the microfinance industry has the potential to tailor the industry in
ways that will better service impoverished individuals. RBI’s credibility, as
well as its authority, may encourage customers to recommence payments on
their loans, curbing the liquidity issues caused by widespread lack of
repayment, and allowing them to continue advancing small loans.
Furthermore, investors, worried about their exposure to the declining
microfinance industry, may view the partnership as the security they need
to continue funding the MFIs.203 The partnership prescribed by the Bill is
199
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also likely to repair the industry’s tarnished reputation. The Bill defines
and adds certainty to the industry’s boundaries, bringing it into the realm of
organized financial services. Perhaps this new image can diminish its
reputation as a wayward, unregulated industry that preys on the poor.
Additionally, the Bill will cap profits that the industry can make from
excessive interest rates and fees, forcing it to refocus its values. This shift
provides room for the industry to embrace the altruistic slant for which it is
traditionally known. Some may worry that the Bill will squelch the
microfinance industry’s ability to make any money, effectively fending off
investors and eliminating a much-needed service to the poor. This view,
however, assumes overly restrictive government mandates that eliminate
the possibility for profit, which is not the case. While the Bill does give the
RBI the authority to cap profit margins,204 it appears to preserve the
potential for profit. If one looks to the market for guidance, it appears that
investors have an optimistic view of the Bill; the Bombay Stock Exchange
reflected a 20% gain in trading for SKS following the announcement of the
proposed Bill, suggesting the market is hopeful about the Bill’s impact on
the industry.205 It seems there is an overwhelming possibility that the Bill
will provide microfinance institutions with the resources they need not only
to survive, but to provide a truly beneficial service to the needy as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
India’s microfinance industry today is at a crossroads: it can continue
to lose money and be viewed in a negative light, or it can reinvent itself
through its realignment with the RBI. Despite the criticism drawn by the
industry in recent years, microfinance fulfills a social need. The industry
offers a unique, frequently utilized service to the poor.206 Lacking
regulation, however, the microfinance industry has expanded without
bounds, and has done so using tactics that have significantly harmed its
borrowers. This conduct has left the industry with a tarnished reputation.
India’s proposed Bill has the potential to further the positive aspects of
microfinance that allow it to be a social utility while minimizing or
eliminating the aspects that cause strife. The Bill provides certainty
regarding the industry’s capabilities and limitations, defining permissible
practices and establishing penalties for unconscionable conduct. It provides
a government partner that will bring the legitimacy and security that
investors require. Perhaps most importantly, the Bill limits excessive,
purely profit-driven behavior, refocusing the industry’s function on the
altruistic foundation it was built on.
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Andhra Pradesh’s draconian regulation offers no compromise; it
threatens to regulate the microfinance industry to the point of futility, thus
limiting the poor’s access to capital. While the State hopes to assert its law,
and is willing to challenge the constitutionality of the Bill in the Supreme
Court, it is likely that the Bill will be found to be constitutional on a variety
of grounds. Although moneylending falls within the exclusive legislative
power of the state, the Bill explicitly distinguishes microfinance from
moneylending, leaving open the prospect of federal regulation.
Furthermore, it is possible that microfinance could be classified as either
“banking” or “the Reserve Bank of India,” both of which explicitly fall
under the federal government’s legislative purview.
Alternatively,
microfinance may be deemed a non-enumerated power, in which case it
would also fall under the federal government’s exclusive legislative
authority. Even in the unlikely event the Supreme Court determines that
microfinance does qualify as moneylending, the federal government could
still prevail by asserting that microfinance is a matter of “national interest”
within their legislative authority. Thus, the Bill will likely survive a
constitutional challenge, allowing the microfinance industry to survive by
avoiding overly restrictive regulations from states like Andhra Pradesh.
Despite recent controversy, altruistic possibilities still exist for India’s
microfinance industry. MFIs maintain the potential to provide the poor
with a vital resource—the capital they are denied by traditional banking
institutions. With the right regulation, the industry can add significant
value to Indian society by providing a service to, rather than imposing a
burden upon, the needy.
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